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THE SEARCH FOR AMERICA’S MOST ELIGIBLE
PATENT: THE IMPACT OF THE BILSKI DECISION ON
OBTAINING PATENTS FOR PROCESSES AND BUSINESS
METHODS
ABSTRACT
For one year, the business community, patent lawyers, and the media
in the United States speculated as to how the Supreme Court would rule in
Bilski v. Kappos. Some forecasted the end of all business method patents,
while others advanced the idea that after the case, practically any business method could be patented. When the dust settled, the Court’s holding
did neither: it determined that the machine-or-transformation test is not
the exclusive test for patent eligibility under Section 101, and left open the
possibility for business method patents to withstand future challenges.
While this result frustrated many that advocated for a bright-line rule,
the Court decided Bilski correctly. Instead of making a sweeping decree,
the Court placed the burden back on the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (CAFC) to develop a nuanced body of case law concerning business method patents and the qualities sufficient to pass muster under Section 101. The CAFC is exactly where this type of case law should be made,
because it has a level of experience in deciding patent appeals cases and
developing patent law that is unmatched. This also leaves the door open
for the Supreme Court to take a future case regarding business method
patents if an issue arises regarding the case law made by the CAFC. As
the nature of technology remains a fluid concept, the laws that govern this
field need to be able to adapt with changing circumstances. The Supreme
Court’s holding in Bilski facilitates this concept, but further complicates
business method analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
For one year, the business community, patent lawyers, and the media
in the United States speculated as to how the Supreme Court would rule in
Bilski v. Kappos. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s decision to grant
certiorari to Bernard Bilski and Rand Warsaw on June 1, 2009,1 and continuing through when the Supreme Court issued its opinion on June 28,
2010,2 licensing companies, investment banks, patent brokers, lobbyists,
patent attorneys, and intellectual property scholars eagerly awaited the
ruling from the high court.3 At issue was the patent eligibility of a business
method. If the Court decided the case broadly, many feared the invalidation of all business method patents, which would forever change commerce in the United States.4
The central issue in Bilski v. Kappos was whether a method of hedging
the risk of commodities trading in the energy market could be categorized
as a “process”—this per the definition of that term in the Patent Law section of the United States Code: 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Section 101),5 and in case
law that further defined the scope of Section 101.6 Section 101 states that
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process ... or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title.”7 This decision had the potential to affect business on a much larger scale than the narrow context of
energy market commodities in Bilski, because the Supreme Court was
presented with the opportunity to invalidate all business method patents.8
1

David Carney, Supreme Court Grants Cert in In re Bilski, TECH. L.J., (June 1,
2009), http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2009/20090601.asp.
2
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
3
See Jon Schwartz, Broad View of Patents on Methods, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010, at
B1.
4
See id.
5
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
6
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225. For case law that defined the scope of Section 101, see
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that a man-made, living
micro-organism “plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter”); State St. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that petitioner’s patent claims to a data processing system were directed to statutory subject matter).
Though both the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court subsequently overruled the State Street holding in Bilski, State Street represented
the law that lower courts applied before the Bilski line of cases.
7
35 U.S.C. § 101.
8
See Steve Lohr, Bilski Ruling: The Patent Wars Untouched, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG
(June 28, 2010, 7:31 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/bilski-ruling-the-pat
ent-wars-untouched/.
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Concern among big businesses was sufficiently high for Microsoft and
Google to file amicus briefs, “appealing for court-defined clarity on what
is and is not a patentable idea.”9
When the Supreme Court finally issued its long-awaited opinion, the
narrow holding was both anticlimactic10 and unhelpful in applying a prospective rule regarding business method patents.11 The Supreme Court
held that the machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for determining the patent eligibility of a process,12 and that Bilski and Warsaw’s
method of hedging the risk of commodities trading in the energy market
was an “unpatentable abstract idea.”13 Josh Lerner, a Harvard Business
School patent expert, noted: “The court is certainly not shutting the door
on business method patents, as some thought it might .... This [decision]
preserves a fair amount of ambiguity.”14 Though companies such as Microsoft and Google argued for a bright line test in their amicus briefs,15
I.B.M. advocated a holding more in line with the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision.16 This indicates a lack of consensus among even big businesses as to the most preferable means of business method patent review.
On one side stand supporters for a bright line rule; on the other are those
in favor of case-by-case review, an approach that could potentially increase litigation.17
Part I of this Note will first examine the machine-or-transformation
test as one method of determining the patent eligibility of a process, as
well as the relationship between that test and Section 101, which indicates
the type of subject matter that is patentable. Part I will then examine proposed changes to Section 101 by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO), prior case law, and the decision rendered by the Court in Bilski.
9

Id.
Id. (“The court [sic] issued its much-anticipated ruling in the big patent case ... and
it was anything but a landmark decision.”).
11
See id. (“Companies ... will be forced to navigate an increasingly abstract patent
minefield, raising business uncertainty and legal costs.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
13
Id. at 3231.
14
Lohr, supra note 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15
See id.
16
Id. (“Manny W. Schecter, I.B.M.’s chief patent counsel, praised the Supreme Court
decision as a measured middle ground—‘exactly what I.B.M. argued for,’ in its brief
filed with the court.”).
17
See Jon Schwartz, Justices Hear Patent Case on Protecting the Abstract, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2009, at B1. Schwartz discusses how some technology companies, such
as Yahoo, favored a broad reading of patent protection, while others, such as Microsoft
and Google, argued for restricting business method patents. Id.
10
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Part II will look at decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (CAFC) that followed in the wake of the Bilski holding. Finally, Part III will argue that the Court correctly arrived at its holding in Bilski, and that it is the responsibility of the CAFC to develop case
law on patent eligibility.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Machine-or-Transformation Test
The CAFC reiterated the “machine-or-transformation” test in its In re
Bilski opinion: “A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if:
(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a
particular article into a different state or thing.”18 In articulating this test,
the CAFC abandoned its previous test for deciding whether a claimed
invention was a patentable “process” under Section 101.19 That test had
asked whether the process produced “a useful, concrete, and tangible result.”20
In abandoning its earlier test, the CAFC held the “machine-ortransformation test” to now be “the sole test governing § 101 analyses,”21
and thus the dispositive “test for determining patent eligibility of a process
under § 101.”22 Upon subsequently applying the machine-or-transforma-

18

In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For earlier uses of the machine-ortransformation test, see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (holding respondent’s claim drawn to patentable subject matter because it transformed an article into
a different state or thing); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978) (arguing that the
Court could be seen at the time as having “only recognized a process as within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change
materials to a ‘different state or thing.’” (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–
88 (1877))); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (indicating the rationale behind the machine-or-transformation test dates back at least as far as the Court’s nineteenth century decision in O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853)).
19
See id. at 991 (Newman, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for departing from
the analysis of prior rulings).
20
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998). The PTO granted Signature Financial Group U.S. Patent 5,193,056, entitled “Data
Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration.” The “spokes”
were mutual funds that pooled their assets in a central “hub.” See AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (finding accord with Supreme Court rulings that an algorithm may be patentable if applied in a useful manner).
21
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 955–56.
22
Id. at 956.
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tion test, the CAFC held in In re Bilski that the petitioners’ application was
not patent-eligible.23
Bernard Bilski and Rand Warsaw’s chances of successfully achieving
patent eligibility would probably have been much greater under the
CAFC’s previous test. 24 Their claimed invention used a process to produce instructions to commodities traders on how to hedge their investments based on changing market conditions, and satisfying this standard
would have been much easier than the test the CAFC adopted, because
Bilski and Warsaw would argue that their process produced useful, concrete, and tangible results in the form of the instructions to commodities
traders.25 In what appeared to be an attempt by the CAFC to limit the
scope of business method patents, however, it essentially changed the
rules of the game. Because the holding indicated that the “machine-ortransformation” method was now the exclusive test, the validity of all
business method patents was suddenly in jeopardy. In order to more fully
understand the impact of the CAFC’s holding in In re Bilski, it is important to underscore how Section 101 interacts with the machine-ortransformation test and business method patents in general.
B. Section 101
Section 101 states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”26 The broad language of Section
101 requires both the federal courts and the PTO to determine more specific requirements for a new and useful process.27 After the decision in
Bilski, the PTO issued interim guidelines for its examiners to use while the
organization worked on rewriting the guidelines.28 The new factors
23

Id. at 963–66.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25
See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010).
26
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
27
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952 (“And the underlying legal question thus presented
is what test or set of criteria governs the determination by the Patent and Trademark
Office (‘PTO’) or courts as to whether a claim to a process is patentable under § 101
....”).
28
See Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Acting Assoc. Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy to the Patent Examining Corps (July 27, 2010), available at http://www
.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/bilski_guidance_27jul2010.pdf (“The Interim Bilski Guidance provides factors to consider in determining whether a claim is directed to an abstract
idea and is therefore not patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Under the Interim Bilski
24
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“should be considered when analyzing the claim as a whole to evaluate
whether a method claim is directed to an abstract idea.”29 The factors that
weigh in favor of eligibility for a patent are: “Recitation of a machine or
transformation (either express or inherent),” “[t]he claim is directed toward applying a law of nature,” and “[t]he claim is more than a mere
statement of a concept.”30 The listed factors that weigh in favor of ineligibility are simply the negative forms of the factors weighing in favor of
eligibility. While this is obvious, it does not give much specific guidance
other than adding “no” or “not” to the criteria for eligibility.31 It seems as
though the PTO, perhaps rightfully so, is not entirely clear on the specific
criteria to be used in evaluating process applications following the Bilski
opinion.
It is evident that Section 101 and the accompanying PTO interim
guidelines provide limited assistance to patent holders and licensing companies trying to predict whether their patents will be deemed invalid after
Bilski. As a result, these tougher questions may have to be litigated in
order to obtain a definitive response, as opposed to reliance on a bright
line rule. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 101 provides
some guidance, but only in very general terms.
C. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Section 101
On a few occasions, the Supreme Court has commented on the scope
of Section 101.32 In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,33 the Court indicated that Section 101 operates as an initial threshold condition: “[N]o patent
is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless
it falls within one of the express categories of patentable subject matter....”34 Thus, the Supreme Court indicated that in order for an invention

Guidance, factors that weigh in favor of patent-eligibility satisfy the criteria of the machine-or-transformation test or provide evidence that the abstract idea has been practically applied, and factors that weigh against patent-eligibility neither satisfy the criteria of
the machine-or-transformation test nor provide evidence that the abstract idea has been
practically applied.”).
29
101 Method Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http:
//www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/bilski_qrs.pdf (last updated Mar. 7, 2011).
30
Id.
31
See id.
32
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974).
33
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 470.
34
Id. at 483.
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to be patentable, it must fall within the “process” requirement of Section
101.35
The Supreme Court also indicated in Diamond v. Chakrabarty36 that,
“[i]n choosing such expansive terms [in Section 101] Congress plainly
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”37 The
Court, however, went on to state that “[t]his is not to suggest that § 101
has no limits or that it embraces every discovery. The laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.”38
For an abstract idea, the Court gave the example that Isaac Newton would
not have been able to patent the law of gravity, because this was something “free to all men.”39 Therefore, although the Court indicated in Diamond that Congress intended the words of Section 101 to be interpreted
expansively, it concluded that abstract ideas fall outside the Section’s
scope.40
Before Bilski, the Court did not elaborate on exactly where the line
should be drawn regarding abstract ideas.41 A number of different factors
ultimately forced the Court to decide to clarify this line, including: the
CAFC’s holding in In re Bilski, the language of Section 101, and the Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of Section 101. These factors effectively set the stage for the Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos.
D. Bilski v. Kappos: Patent Eligibility Under Section 101
Bernard L. Bilski and Rand Warsaw filed a patent application on April
10, 1997 for a method of hedging the risk of commodities trading in the
energy market based on weather patterns and an analysis of historical

35

Id.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303.
37
Id. at 308.
38
Id. at 309; see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (“While these
exceptions are not required by the statutory text, they are consistent with the notion that a
patentable process must be ‘new and useful.’ And, in any case, these exceptions have
defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150
years.” (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 174–75 (1853))).
39
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
40
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“This Court has undoubtedly
recognized limits to § 101 .... Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”).
41
See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (“The line between a patentable
‘process’ and an unpatentable ‘principle’ is not always clear.”).
36
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pricing.42 The patent examiner rejected Bilski and Warsaw’s patent.43
Subsequently, the Board of Patent Appeals and later the CAFC affirmed
the patent examiner’s ruling.44
The important claims for the patent application were claims one and
four.45 Claim one explained a sequence of steps on how to hedge risk.46
Claim four plugged the concept described in claim one into a mathematical formula.47 The other claims in the application described how claims
one and four could be applied “to allow energy suppliers and consumers to
minimize the risks resulting from fluctuations in market demand for energy.”48 Kappos argued three reasons why the invention should not be patent-eligible: “(1) [I]t is not tied to a machine and does not transform an
article; (2) it involves a method of conducting business; and (3) it is merely an abstract idea.”49 Bilski argued that nothing in Section 101 or the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence mandated limiting approval of process
patents to those claimed inventions that satisfied the machine-or-transformation test.50
The Supreme Court disagreed with the CAFC’s holding that the machine-or-transformation test was the sole test for determining whether an
invention was a process, as the Court thought that this decision “impose[d]
other limitations that are inconsistent with the text and the statute’s purpose and design.”51 The Court did not, however, indicate that the machineor-transformation test was an incorrect test; it simply stated that it was not
the sole test.52 The Court explained: “A categorical rule denying patent
protection for ‘inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress ... would

42

Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223–24.
Id. The patent examiner explained that “[the application] is not implemented on a
specific apparatus and merely manipulates [an] abstract idea and solves a purely mathematical problem without any limitation to a practical application, therefore, the invention
is not directed to the technological arts.” (second alteration in original) (quoting App. to
Pet. for Cert. 148a) (internal quotation marks omitted). Id.
44
Id. at 3224.
45
Id. at 3223.
46
Id. at 3223–24.
47
Id. at 3223.
48
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3224.
49
Id. at 3223.
50
See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (No. 08-964), 2009 WL
3453657 at *3.
51
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226.
52
See id. (“Adopting the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test for what constitutes a ‘process’ (as opposed to just an important and useful clue) violates ... statutory
interpretation principles.”).
43
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frustrate the purposes of the patent law.’”53 As an example, the Court
illustrated that if a categorical rule for patent applications had been previously adopted, many “unforeseen” innovations such as computer programs
would not have been able to receive patents.54 Patent law is seen as a dynamic field, one in which categorical rules are not particularly well suited.55
The Court took no position on where to draw the line as to which specific criteria were important in making the determination on what types of
inventions should be deemed patent-eligible.56 The decision did not categorically foreclose the possibility of business methods receiving patents in
the future, and it did not invalidate business method patents previously
issued by the PTO.57 In so deciding, the Court avoided the catastrophic
result feared by many in the business sector.58 Here, the Court essentially
declined to articulate a bright-line test that could be applied in future cases, as urged by Google and Microsoft in their respective amicus briefs.59
After clarifying that the machine-or-transformation test was not the
sole test for determining whether a process was patent-eligible, but rather
a factor that could be considered, the Court indicated that the patent application at issue was correctly rejected because it represented an “abstract
idea.”60 The Court looked to precedent established in three previous patent
cases to arrive at this conclusion.61 Gottschalk v. Benson and Parker v.
Flook both involved petitioners attempting to patent a mathematical algorithm.62 In both cases, the Court reasoned that the algorithms at issue were

53
Id. at 3227 (alteration in original) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
315 (1980)).
54
See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
55
See id.
56
See id. at 3228 (“With ever more people trying to innovate and thus seeking patent
protections for their inventions, the patent law faces a great challenge in striking the
balance between protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that
others would discover by independent, creative application of general principles. Nothing
in this opinion should be read to take a position on where that balance ought to be
struck.”).
57
See id. (“[T]he Court today is not commenting on the patentability of any particular
invention, let alone holding that any of the above-mentioned technologies from the Information Age should or should not receive patent protection.”).
58
See supra notes 3–4, 8–9 and accompanying text.
59
See Lohr, supra note 8.
60
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229–30.
61
Id. (discussing the rulings in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1980), Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), and Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)).
62
See id. at 3230.
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abstract ideas and not processes.63 On the other hand, in Diamond v.
Diehr, the Court held that the patent application in question was in fact a
process, because though it included a mathematical formula, it used the
mathematical formula to “mold[] raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured
precision products,” and the Court considered this a tangible result that
met the requirements of Section 101.64 Applying the principles from the
three cases above, the Court concluded that Bilski and Warsaw’s claims
were more like the algorithms from Benson and Flook, and were thus unpatentable abstract ideas.65
All nine justices agreed that the patent examiner correctly denied
Bilski’s application to patent a method of hedging risk in commodities
trading.66 Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion and was joined in full by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito.67 Justice Stevens
wrote a concurrence joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.68
These justices agreed that the machine-or-transformation test was not the
sole test for determining whether a process was patent-eligible under Section 101, but indicated that they did not believe business methods should
be patent-eligible under any circumstances.69
Justice Breyer, joined in part by Justice Scalia, filed a separate concurrence.70 Though the latter Justice did not join with the former’s view that
business methods were not patent-eligible,71 the two did find common
ground in Justice Breyer’s highlighting of four substantive points.72 First,
though Section 101 is broad, Justice Breyer wrote that “it is not without
63

See id. (“The Court [in Benson] then held the application at issue was not a ‘process,’ but an unpatentable abstract idea .... Flook stands for the proposition that the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the
use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or adding ‘insignificant
postsolution activity.’” (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92)).
64
Id. (“Diehr explained that while an abstract idea, law of nature, or mathematical
formula could not be patented, ‘an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.’” (quoting
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187)).
65
See id. at 3231.
66
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (“[A]ll members of the Court agree that the patent application at issue here falls outside of § 101 because it claims an abstract idea.”).
67
Id. at 3223.
68
Id.
69
See id. at 3232 (“More precisely, although a process is not patent-ineligible simply
because it is useful for conducting business, a claim that merely describes a method of
doing business does not qualify as a ‘process’ under § 101.”).
70
Id. at 3223.
71
Id. at 3257.
72
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3258–59.
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limit.”73 Second, he noted that the machine-or-transformation test has
repeatedly helped the Supreme Court decide what a patentable process
is.74 Third, Breyer observed that, “while the machine-or-transformation
test has always been a ‘useful and important clue,’ it has never been the
‘sole test’ for determining patentability.”75 Fourth, Breyer asserted that the
Court’s decision cannot be read as reviving the discredited patentability
test of whether a process produces “a useful, concrete, and tangible result.”76
With the Justices offering so many views on the matter, no one opinion carried the majority of the Court. The only point on which all Justices
could agree was that Bilski and Warsaw’s patent application should be
denied.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Bilski Holding
The Court rejected adopting a categorical rule that would exclude patenting business methods.77 Bilski, however, seemed to provide no new
guidance or test for determining whether a process or method may be
patented under Section 101. The question arises, therefore, as to whether
Bilski actually changed anything, or whether it simply reiterated the law as
it existed. Going forward, it seems as though the patent eligibility of all
such new processes will be determined on a case-by-case basis under this
Supreme Court precedent, which provides little substantive guidance for
analyzing the difficult grey areas in the arena of patent law.
Bilski holds that the machine-or-transformation test is an important
clue, but not the exclusive test for deciding if new processes or methods
are patentable.78 Although Bilski does not preclude the patentability of all
business methods in the future, the decision does indicate that business
methods like the one brought by Bilski will not be approved. Adding to
the uncertainty was the insistence of four Justices who stated that business

73

Id. at 3258.
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 3259 (quoting State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (“[I]n reemphasizing that the machine-or-transformation test is not
necessarily the sole test of patentability, the Court intends neither to deemphasize the
test’s usefulness, nor to suggest that many patentable processes lie beyond its reach.”).
77
Id. at 3231.
78
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
74
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methods are not patentable at all79—though of those four, Justice Stevens
has since retired.80 Finally, there remains no clear agreement as to how the
statutory language in Section 101 should be interpreted.81
B. Other Cases That Implicate Bilski
1. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services: Applying the Bilski Holding
In one of the first cases to be reviewed after the Supreme Court’s holding in Bilski, the CAFC reviewed a case returned to them on remand from
the Supreme Court.82 The Supreme Court remanded the case so that the
CAFC could consider the issue by taking into account the Bilski decision.83
At issue in Prometheus were patents “which claim methods for determining the optimal dosage of thiopurine drugs used to treat gastrointestinal and non-gastrointestinal autoimmune diseases.”84 At the trial level, the
district court found that “the claims have three steps: (1) administering the
drug to a subject, (2) determining metabolite levels, and (3) being warned
that an adjustment in dosage may be required.”85 The district court indicated that simply because the inventors described the claims as “treatment
methods,” this did not make them “patent-eligible subject matter.”86 In
particular, the district court found that the first two steps were “merely
necessary data-gathering steps for any use of the correlations.”87 The third
step, the district court stated, was “only a mental step.”88 In concluding
that the claims were not patent-eligible, the district court found that the
third “warning” step was not really a step at all, because “it was the metabolite levels themselves that ‘warn’ the doctor that an adjustment in
dosage may be required.”89
79

See id. at 3223.
See Bill Mears, Court Ends Term, Offering Tributes to Stevens, CNN JUSTICE (June
28, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-28/justice/us.scotus.stevens_1_court-ends-ter
m-chief-justice-john-roberts-supreme-court?_s=PM:CRIME.
81
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
82
See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1349
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
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Id.
84
Id. at 1349–50.
85
Id. at 1352.
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Id.
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Id.
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Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1352.
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Id.
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Regarding its first Prometheus opinion, issued prior to the Bilski holding, the CAFC explained its rejection of the district court’s findings by
stating:
We held that the district court erred as a matter of law in finding Prometheus’s asserted medical treatment claims to be drawn to nonstatutory subject matter under this court’s machine-or-transformation
test, which we had held in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
to be the definitive test for determining the patentability of a process
under § 101.90

In other words, in its initial Prometheus decision vacated by the Supreme Court after Bilski, the CAFC had indicated that the claims were
valid under the machine-or-transformation test.91
Importantly, the Supreme Court acknowledged the CAFC’s Prometheus holding, and remanded the case in light of its Bilski decision.92 In
Bilski, the Court indicated that “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas” have been held not patentable.93 Applications of these three
categories, however, might qualify for a patent.94 The CAFC had to decide, therefore, whether the claims in Prometheus attempted to patent a
natural phenomenon, or if the claims represented instead an application of
that phenomenon.95 The CAFC affirmed its previous holding, taking into
account the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Bilski.96
The CAFC stated that “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski did
not undermine our preemption analysis of Prometheus’s claims and it
rejected the machine-or-transformation test only as a definitive test.”97
Therefore, because the Supreme Court left the preemption analysis untouched, this language from the CAFC demonstrates the limitations of the
holding in Bilski. Perhaps a reason the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Bilski was to confirm what many already believed: Bilski did not significantly alter the landscape of patent-eligible claims.

90

Id. at 1349.
Kevin E. Noonan, Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services
(Fed. Cir. 2010), PATENT DOCS (Dec. 20, 2010, 11:59 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2
010/12/prometheus-laboratories-inc-v-mayo-collaborative-services-fed-cir-2010.html.
92
Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1349.
93
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
94
See id. at 3229–30.
95
Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1354.
96
Id. at 1349.
97
Id. at 1355.
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The CAFC succinctly summarized in Prometheus exactly what the
Supreme Court accomplished in Bilski.98 The CAFC wrote: “The [Supreme] Court merely stated that the Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that this Court has endorsed the machine-or-transformation test as the
exclusive test.”99 Some commentators have argued that the real mandate
from the Supreme Court in Bilski was to signal to the CAFC a need to
develop and refine their case law regarding what constitutes an “abstract
idea” for patent-eligibility.100
Finally, the CAFC indicated that Prometheus’s claims satisfied the
transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation test, because their
invention transforms the human body and its components after the concentrations are determined and the drugs are administered.101 Because the
claims independently satisfied the transformation prong of the machine-ortransformation test, the CAFC did not need to assess whether they constituted a machine.102 The CAFC, possibly supplementing its definition of
patent-eligible claims, indicated that “[t]he asserted claims are in effect
claims to methods of treatment, which are always transformative when
one of a defined group of drugs is administered to the body to ameliorate
the effects of an undesired condition.”103
98

Id.
Id. at 1355. The Court of Appeals added: “Thus, the Court did not disavow the machine-or-transformation test. And, as applied to the present claims, the ‘useful and important clue, an investigative tool,’ leads to a clear and compelling conclusion, viz., that
the present claims pass muster under § 101. They do not encompass laws of nature or
preempt natural correlations.” Id.
100
See Noonan, supra note 91 (“Such an approach has the potential to adequately (or
at least sufficiently) illuminate the relevant principles in the fire of litigation, to provide a
collection of decisions that might assist the Court when (and if) it decides to reenter the
patent-eligibility waters. The Court in Bilski was properly prudent in its approach with
regard to ‘new technologies’”); see also Jason Rantenen, Prometheus Laboratories v.
Mayo: The Broad Scope of Statutory Subject Matter, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 22, 2010, 7:30
AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/12/prometheus-laboratories-v-mayo-the-bro
ad-scope-of-statutory-subject-matter.html (“Furthermore, the court stated, neither the
Supreme Court’s order to vacate and remand the original Prometheus decision nor Bilski
dictates a wholly different analysis or different result .... In support of its conclusion, the
court reiterated its earlier determination that the treatment methods in Prometheus’s
patents satisfy the ‘machine-or-transformation test.’ Although this is not the exclusive
test, post-Bilski, it nevertheless provides important clues to subject matter patentabil[i]ty.”).
101
Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1355.
102
Id. at 1356.
103
Id. (“More specifically, Prometheus here claimed methods for optimizing efficacy
and reducing toxicity of treatment regimes for gastrointestinal and non-gastrointestinal
autoimmune diseases that utilize drugs providing 6-TG by administering a drug to a
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By affirming their pre-Bilski decision in Prometheus, the CAFC thus
confirmed the very narrow holding of Bilski, which established that the
machine-or-transformation test is not the exclusive test for determining
patent eligibility. The CAFC took its cue from the Supreme Court, and
continued to develop case law regarding the patent eligibility of abstract
ideas. Without citing any cases, the CAFC stated that when a claim involves a group of drugs that are administered to cure an illness, these
claims are always classified as transformative.104
If Prometheus is any indication of the types of patent eligibility opinions we will see from the CAFC going forward, the court will continue to
generate more detailed and nuanced case law regarding the patent eligibility of abstract ideas. The CAFC, while making decisions on a case-by-case
basis, should also articulate rules whenever possible, as it did in Prometheus.
Another case, Research Corporation Technologies v. Microsoft, was
also decided by the CAFC shortly after Bilski, and similarly progressed the
case law regarding process patents.105
2. Research Corporation Technologies v. Microsoft: Refocusing the
Eligibility Inquiry
In Research Corporation, the CAFC reviewed a pre-Bilski decision of
the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, which had held
that two of Research Corporation Technologies’ (RCT) patents were ineligible because they did not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test, and
therefore that the defendant, Microsoft, had not infringed upon them.106
RCT’s patents, said the district court, “relate to digital image halftoning.
Digital images are, in fact, thousands of pixels arranged in arrays of rows
and columns.”107 Essentially, the district court determined that RCT’s
patents created a different type of halftoning called a “blue noise mask.”108
Referring to Bilski, the CAFC indicated that “[i]n refocusing the eligibility inquiry on the statute, the Supreme Court advised that [S]ection 101
eligibility should not become a substitute for a patentability analysis relatsubject. The invention’s purpose to treat the human body is made clear in the specification and the preambles of the asserted claims.”).
104
See id.
105
Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft, 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
106
See id. at 866.
107
Id. at 862–63.
108
Id. at 863 (“Another way to observe the quality of a halftone is to use a power
spectrum associated with each dot profile obtained from the halftoning process.”).
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ed to prior art, adequate disclosure, or the other conditions and requirements of Title 35.”109 The CAFC then classified the subject matter in the
case at bar as the process for rending a halftone image.110 Then, the court
specifically acknowledged that the Supreme Court had directed it to explore more deeply and define the question of whether a given subject matter is abstract, along with rejecting an inflexible singular test.111 As such,
the CAFC declined to provide a rigid test, deciding only that, for a process
to be patented, it must “override the broad statutory categories of eligible
subject matter.”112
The CAFC acknowledged that algorithms and formulas constituted a
significant portion of the claims and stated that the “patents require a ‘high
contrast film,’ ‘a film printer,’ ‘a memory,’ and ‘printer and display devices’” in confirming that the patents were in fact not abstract.113 The CAFC,
therefore, determined that even when significant equations or algorithms
exist in a patent, if the patent also contains tangible devices, it will generally be protected from falling into the abstract category. It is unclear as to
what the ratio of mathematical equations to tangible devices should be;
however, this decision suggests that if a patent contains even a small number of tangible devices, that factor will save it from the “abstract” label.
Some legal professionals claimed that the holding in Research Corporation “places a high hurdle in front of challengers who seek to invalidate
process patents on the third ground [abstract idea].”114 Indeed, it does
seem as though the bar is set high. Tough questions for the CAFC will
involve scenarios that fall somewhere in between Bilski and Research
Corporation. Research Corporation and Prometheus affirmed that the
CAFC is going to determine which particular set of facts gives rise to
patent eligibility on a case-by-case basis. These are two of the first postBilski cases, and they indicate that the CAFC is committed to developing
the scope of abstractness under Section 101.

109

Id. at 868 (“In other words, [S]ection 101 does not permit a court to reject subject
matter categorically because it finds that a claim is not worthy of a patent.”).
110
Id.
111
Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 868 (“The Supreme Court did not presume to provide
a rigid formula or definition for abstractness.”).
112
Id. (“With that guidance, this court also will not presume to define ‘abstract’ beyond the recognition that this disqualifying characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter and the
statutory context that directs primary attention on the patentability criteria of the rest of
the Patent Act.”).
113
Id. at 869.
114
Rantenen, supra note 100.
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This Note will proceed to discuss why the Supreme Court correctly
decided Bilski, but it will also address problems associated with the Bilski
holding.
III. WHY THE SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED BILSKI
The Supreme Court correctly decided to issue a narrow holding in
Bilski when it rejected adopting a categorical rule that would exclude
patenting business methods.115 Even though Bilski concerned patenteligibility, at the heart of the case was the issue of abstractness and how
the CAFC could better define aspects of a process that would invalidate a
patent.116
A. Practical Concerns with Issuing a Broad Holding
If the Supreme Court had issued a broad holding in Bilski invalidating
all business method patents, the decision could have potentially negatively
affected the national economy, because many large businesses hold business method patents.117 Conversely, had the Supreme Court issued a broad
holding in the other direction to allow all forms of business methods, almost anything could then have been patented. In its amicus brief, IBM
argued that patent-eligible subject matter for processes should be limited
to processes that involve technological contributions.118 IBM, and others
advancing that argument, seemed to be in line with the Court’s ruling.
The concern with invalidating all business method patents, “such as
software, biomarkers, medical diagnostics and information technology,”
was the “concern that many patent portfolios that have been developed in
these fields, at considerable time and expense, [and] may not have future
value, or greatly diminished future value.”119 This diminished value could
115

Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010).
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
117
See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
118
Brief for Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
2–3, Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (No. 08-964) (“IBM respectfully submits that the gravamen
of that precedent, as informed by the constitutional objective of ‘promot[ing] the Progress
of Science and useful Arts,’ is that a patentable ‘process’ within the meaning of § 101 is
one that involves a technological contribution - namely, a process that either (i) is tied to
a particular machine or apparatus, or (ii) causes transformation or reduction of an article
to a different state or thing, and in either instance produces technologically beneficial
results.”).
119
Stuart S. Levy, Bilski v. Kappos: New Vista or End of the Road for Many Business
Methods and New Technologies?, 79 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 283, at
12 (Jan. 15, 2010).
116
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potentially negatively affect the many companies that hold patents in “established or emerging technologies.”120 While many amicus briefs were
not in favor of either party, of the sixty-six amicus briefs filed for the
Bilski Supreme Court case, sixty-one argued that the machine-or-transformation test should not be the sole test for patent-eligible subject matter.121
Taking into account Supreme Court precedent, Congressional intent,
and practical concerns, this was the holding that made the most sense for
the Supreme Court to issue. In particular, a broad ruling from the Supreme
Court would have been unwise given the presence of the CAFC, as that
court’s specialization in patent cases leaves it much better equipped to
create case law upon the presentation of patent claims.122
B. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Is in a Better Position to
Make the Close Calls
The CAFC is “unique among the thirteen Circuit Courts of Appeals,”123 because it has exclusive jurisdiction over patent claims nationwide. With these claims appealed only to the CAFC, its judges are particularly familiar with such cases.124 It is much more responsible for the
Supreme Court to accept review when the CAFC has issued a holding that
the Supreme Court feels needs clarification, rather than simply issuing a
broad ruling in an area that is not its specialty. For these reasons, the
CAFC is in a much better position to develop patent case law.
Currently in its twenty-ninth year of existence, “the CAFC has steadily
gained momentum, maturity, and acceptance.”125 The CAFC was created
in the late 1970s in order to remedy “a faltering patent enforcement system
that threatened further industrial, technological, employment, and economic decline.”126 While the CAFC does not exclusively hear patent cases,
about one third of the cases the court decides every year are patent cases,
120

Id.
Id.
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See infra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.
123
Court Jurisdiction, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.ca
fc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (“It has
nationwide jurisdiction in a variety of subject areas, including international trade, government contracts, patents, trademarks, certain money claims against the United States
government, federal personnel, veterans’ benefits, and public safety officers’ benefits
claims.”).
124
Id.
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Paul R. Michel, Past, Present, and Future in the Life of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1199, 1199 (2010).
126
Id. at 1200.
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and at least five of the sixteen judges presently on the court were patent
attorneys before appointment to the bench.127 Typically, a panel of judges
hearing any given case will be composed of one or two judges with a patent background and one or two judges without a patent background.128
Additionally, all of the judges of the CAFC are required to live in Washington, D.C.129 As former Chief Judge Michel has written: “Some consider
our court the technology court—and so it is. But it is also the business and
commerce court, the innovation court, and the job-creating, prosperityexpanding court. It is, in short, a national asset.”130
The CAFC possesses a level of experience in deciding patent appeals
cases and developing patent law that is unmatched in the other circuits.
The Supreme Court correctly issued a narrow holding in Bilski, allowing
the CAFC to establish clearer patent-eligibility requirements in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision that the machine-or-transformation test is not
the sole method for determining patent eligibility. As seen from decisions
such as Prometheus and Research Corporation, it is in the CAFC where a
body of nuanced and meaningful patent eligibility law can and should be
developed.
C. Problems Caused by the Holding in Bilski
One of the major problems with the holding in Bilski is that it encourages litigation to determine whether a specific patent qualifies as abstract.
Specifically, by the Supreme Court’s unspoken directive to the CAFC to
further develop its case law, the Supreme Court’s Bilski decision will
likely give rise to increased process patent litigation.
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont is an outspoken critic of the Bilski
holding.131 Senator Leahy has claimed that Bilski did not resolve the “real
issue with business method patents,” and that it could spawn unnecessary
127

Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1201–02.
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Id. at 1203 (“This proximity helps newer judges learn the many unfamiliar legal
subjects they must master. It also helps all of our active judges work together more closely, collegially, and continually than if the twelve were geographically dispersed across
twelve different states. It should be noted that a proposal to revise the patent laws now
pending in the Senate would rescind this residency requirement. Proponents, which
include several of our judges, cite the symbolic benefit of judges of a national court
having nationwide residency and the practical benefit of an even larger talent pool.”).
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Michel, supra note 125, at 1211.
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Jessica Dye, Leahy Says Bilski Exemplifies Patent Law Problems, LAW 360 (June
28, 2010, 3:12 PM), http://www.law360.com/topnews/articles/177772/leahy-says-bilski-e
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litigation unless Congress acts.132 Leahy has suggested that “[t]he Court’s
opinion, joined by only five of the justices, needlessly left the door open
for business method patents to issue in the future, and I am concerned that
it will lead to more unnecessary litigation.”133 While unnecessary litigation
is a valid concern and is often undesirable, it is more favorable than issuing a broader holding that may significantly affect the United States economy in a negative way.
Recently, the Senate passed a patent reform bill called the America Invents Act (the Act),134 which President Barack Obama signed into law on
September 16, 2011.135 The Act did not include language affecting the
Supreme Court’s holding in Bilski; rather, it called for a first-to-file patent
system, thus constituting a significant change from the United States’
current first-to-invent system.136 Senator Leahy, the main sponsor of the
Act, declared that “[t]he America Invents Act will promote American
innovation, create American jobs and grow America’s economy, all without spending a penny of taxpayer money.”137 The Act’s lack of reference
to Bilski, meanwhile, indicates that Congress will likely not respond to
that Supreme Court decision, instead allowing the CAFC to formulate its
own law regarding tests for patent eligibility.
CONCLUSION
The Bilski case created much speculation as to both the future of business method patents and the impact of a broad holding on commerce in the
United States. The Supreme Court’s decision to issue a narrow holding,
which simply determined that the machine-or-transformation test is not the
exclusive test for patent eligibility,138 left open the possibility for business
method patents to withstand future challenges.
By its holding, the Court sent a message to the CAFC to refine and develop its case law regarding abstractness as it relates to patent eligibility.
In the cases following Bilski, the CAFC seemed to acknowledge this message. While a bright-line rule such as the machine-or-transformation test
132
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Hayley Tsukayama, The Circuit: Senate Passes Patent Reform, Hearing on Net
Neutrality, Europe Grapples with Cookie Law, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2011, 8:45 AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2011/03/the_circuit_senate_passes_pate.html.
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can be beneficial in various circumstances, the Supreme Court correctly
decided the scope of Bilski, because a subject as complex as patent eligibility requires a nuanced approach supported by case law that evolves as
technology changes. As the nature of technology remains a fluid concept,
it is proper for the laws that govern this field to be able to adapt with the
changing circumstances.
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